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Abstract This paper evaluates the effect of tax incentives for research and develop-
ment (R&D) on R&D spending and employment of R&D staff in a quasi-experimental
setting.Todo this, I exploit an exogenous reform inUKR&Dtaxpolicy,which changed
the definition of an SME fromfirmswith fewer than 250 employees to thosewith fewer
than 500 employees. I use the UK Business Enterprise Research and Development
Survey (BERD), for which companies do not have an incentive to relabel their ordi-
nary employees or spending as R&D. I find that R&D tax incentives help to increase
R&D spending at the company level; this translates to a user cost elasticity between
−0.88 and −1.18. Further, the additional R&D generated through the tax relief can be
attributed entirely to an increase in the number of R&D employees in the companies’
workforce. Together, these results challenge a common narrative on the role of R&D
tax incentives.
Keywords R&D · Tax credits · Quasi-experiment · Difference-in-differences
JEL Classification H25 · O30
1 Introduction
Governments subsidise R&D in order to reach the socially optimal level of private
investment in innovation.1 From the government’s perspective, one way of subsidis-
1 The mechanisms underlying the private sector’s underinvestment problem have been laid out in,
among others, Arrow (1962), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Jones and Williams (1998).
B Irem Guceri
irem.guceri@sbs.ox.ac.uk
1 Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Oxford, UK
123
I. Guceri
ing private R&D is to directly fund projects that it chooses from a pool of applicants.
From the companies’ perspective, R&D is a risky activity and the companies them-
selves are better informed than the government to decide on the potential success
and economic viability of their R&D opportunities. Criticisms over the government’s
ability in choosing the best R&D projects have led to an increased emphasis on tax
incentives to support private R&D. The USA, France and Japan have offered R&D tax
incentives for decades now, but in the 2000s, the implementation of this policy became
ever more prevalent, with France and Japan substantially increasing the generosity of
their R&D tax incentive schemeswhile someother leading players inR&Dand innova-
tion such as South Korea, China and the UK introduced schemes that later constituted
a large portion of government financing for business R&D in these countries.
In this paper, I explore the channels through which R&D tax incentives operate to
affect firm behaviour. I achieve this by analysing the impact of R&D tax relief on the
real R&D spending andR&Demployment in a firm. I apply a difference-in-differences
regression approach, using the micro-level Business Enterprise Research and Devel-
opment (BERD) data for the UK collected by the Office for National Statistics (ONS).
I exploit a discontinuity in the design of the schemes in order to identify the policy
impact.
This paper makes the following contributions. First, the policy reform considered
here provides a valuable opportunity to identify the effects of R&D tax incentives.
In a setting where SMEs are eligible for more generous tax incentives, the reform
doubles the thresholds that identify an SME, generating a natural control group whose
user cost of R&D capital remains unaffected by the reform, and a natural treatment
group composed of firms which experience a drastic reduction in their user cost.
Second, the ONS BERD survey includes information on ‘total R&D spending,’ and
not just spending that ‘qualifies’ for the relief. It also provides information on R&D
employment which enables me to explore whether the R&D spending that appears
to have been generated by the reform is a result of firms increasing the scale of their
R&D activities, or if the changes are driven by mere price increases that do not affect
the R&D headcount. Third, when collecting the data, the ONS reassures firms that
the data on individual companies cannot be identified or used for other purposes than
statistical analysis.2 This mitigates firms’ incentives to lie about their R&D spending
or to relabel ordinary spending as R&D.
There is an emerging literature that explores the impact of tax incentives on R&D
by exploiting policy discontinuities.3 A recent wave of studies use administrative data
in a quasi-experimental setup (examples are Agrawal et al. 2014; Guceri and Liu
2015; Rao 2016; Dechezlepretre et al. 2016). These studies generally find a positive
and significant effect of tax incentives on R&D spending by businesses. One main
advantage of administrative data is the access to information on the firms’ tax positions
and whether they benefited immediately from a tax deduction. A disadvantage, on the
other hand, is that companies may have an incentive to misreport ordinary spending
2 The ONS Code of Confidentiality can be found at https://www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/
monitoring-and-assessment/code-of-practice/.
3 A review of the earlier wave of structural estimates can be found in Kohler et al. (2012).
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as R&D to obtain the tax credit. Moreover, information in tax return data is usually
more limited, for example, to expenditures that qualify for tax incentives.
Wider availability of micro-level data has enabled quasi-experimental work on
direct subsidies for R&D as well. In Bronzini and Iachini (2014), for example, the
authors use data on the population of applicants to an R&D subsidy in northern Italy
to evaluate a direct subsidy programme and find that only smaller firms responded to
the subsidy by increasing their R&D spending.
The finding that tax incentives for R&Dmay have a positive impact on R&D spend-
ing attracted criticism from twomain angles. First, Goolsbee (1998) andRogers (2010)
warned that with the introduction of R&D support policies, the majority of increased
R&D expenditures may go to higher salaries for scientists and engineers, rather than
fund the employment of a larger number of researchers to scale up R&D activities.
Goolsbee (1998) supported this finding bydemonstrating that there is a relatively stable
supply of scientists, with expenditure on pay rising significantly following increases
in government subsidies to support R&D expenditure by firms. Lokshin and Mohnen
(2013) showed firm-level evidence from the Netherlands that there is some wage
response to R&D tax credits. Second, many studies flagged the issue of relabelling
ordinary expenses as R&D, even though the extent of the problem has rarely been
quantified. Some evidence of relabelling was provided in an early report by the US
General Accounting Office (1989), which found that around 20% of revenue agents
were not convinced by the clarity of the definition of qualifying expenses. A more
recent US GAO study (2009) identified the main expenditure items which are more
difficult to monitor for the tax authority. On the top of their list was the proportion of
salaries paid to management-level staff who supervise research activities.
Another strand of the related literature evaluates the effectiveness of public funds,
without restricting attention to fiscal incentives for firms in stimulating R&D and
innovative activity. Zuniga-Vicente et al. (2014) and Becker (2015) survey this broader
literature, with a discussion of the comparisons between the benefits of direct subsidies
and tax incentives. There is some evidence in the literature that young start ups, which
are very important for the innovation ecosystem of countries, benefit more from direct
subsidies as they incur losses for extendedperiods of timebefore switching to profitable
positions (Bronzini and Piselli 2016). For these firms, tax deductions or credits have
very little value in present discounted terms, especially if they are cash constrained.
The UK system is relatively generous towards loss-making companies, as it offers
a cash refund for loss-makers, as well as the option to carry the benefit forward or
back (OECD 2010). Most schemes around the world do not offer cash refunds, and
some do not even allow the benefit to be carried back or forward in time. The BERD
data does not provide information on the tax positions of companies, but it is not
unreasonable to assume that firms across the range of tax positions are able to benefit
from tax incentives. The treatment of losses for the purpose of the R&D tax relief is an
important design aspect that needs to be considered when benchmarking the findings
of this paper with studies based on other countries’ data.
The micro-level BERD survey that I use in this study is anonymous, and the data
cannot be matched with the tax records due to ONS’s legal promise to the respondents.
This legal requirement presents an opportunity for the purpose of this study, as com-
panies do not have an incentive to misreport their ordinary spending as R&D when
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responding to the BERD survey. The other advantage is that the BERD survey has a
measure for R&D headcount within the company, allowing for the study of changes
in the firm’s R&D employment.
The composition of R&D spending stimulated by tax incentives remained an under-
explored area. There is evidence that the corporation tax system affects both the
quantity and the quality of innovative activity (Ernst et al. 2014). The recent rise
in favourable tax treatments of patent income is also of interest given that such incen-
tives may complement or substitute R&D tax credits. With the OECD-led process to
tackle Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), there is more of an inclination by
governments towards attaching such ‘patent box’ regimes to real R&D activity. This
paper abstracts away from issues related to international shifting of profits arising from
innovative activity (these issues are discussed in detail in Evers et al. 2014). I focus
here on the input side of R&D, aiming to identify the quantity effects separately from
any relabelling or price effects of tax incentives on R&D inputs.
Hall and Van Reenen (2000) underlines the difficulty and the importance of finding
exogenous variation in the user cost of capital to identify the effect of tax incentive-type
R&D support policies. The UK policy setting provides a suitable basis for exploiting
such exogenous variation, using a difference-in-difference methodology with individ-
ual fixed effects, as often applied in public policy contexts (for examples, see Yagan
2015; Zwick and Mahon 2017). In the UK, R&D tax incentives were first introduced
for SMEs (in 2000) and then for large companies (in 2002). In 2008, two reforms took
place. First the rates for enhanced deduction increased for SMEs from £150 to £175
for each £100 spent on R&D (150% to 175%), and for large firms the rate increase
was from 125 to 130%. For the large firms, the increase did not lead to a substantive
reduction in the cost of R&D capital because there was also a reduction in the tax rate.
For SMEs, the reform had amore substantial effect. In August 2008, more importantly,
the definition to qualify as an SME changed from 250 employees to 500 employees
(along with other criteria, which I discuss in Sect. 2). This second reform that took
place in 2008 meant a large decline in the user cost of R&D capital for the medium-
sized companies whose definition changed from ‘large’ to ‘SME’ for the purpose of
the R&D tax relief. The drop in the user cost of R&D capital was on average 17% for
this ‘treated’ group of firms depending on their taxable profit.4
I find that the treated firms increased their R&D spending by around 15–20% on
average in response to the reform. Measuring against the 17% average reduction in
the user cost of R&D capital, the increase translates to an implied user cost elasticity
estimate of around −0.88 to −1.18 (with the latter coming from the preferred sam-
ple), which is in the same ballpark as the cross-country finding of Bloom et al. (2002)
that used an instrumental variables approach.Without considering the social returns to
R&D through spillover effects, I calculate that the return to each £1 foregone in corpo-
ration tax is between£0.75and£1.2 inR&Ddependingon the taxpositionof claimants,
suggesting that the government recovers its cost from implementing the policy.
4 The estimates of the user cost of capital are based on Guceri and Liu (2015), since the BERD dataset
does not provide information on companies’ tax positions and hence on the changes in their user cost of
R&D capital.
123
Will the real R&D employees please stand up?
This paper pins down a mechanism through which R&D tax incentives affect firm-
level outcomes. Thanks to the richness of the BERD survey data, in the present paper,
I can observe both the R&D spending and R&D employment responses, allowing the
paper to address the questions raised earlier regarding the impact of R&D policy in
an environment with inelastic supply of researchers. The use of information on total
R&D spending (as opposed to only qualifying R&D) and the possibility to differen-
tiate between ‘price’ and ‘quantity’ effects distinguishes this paper from other recent
working papers that use theUK tax returns data on qualifyingR&D.TheBERDdataset
that I use in this study and the corporate tax returns data cannot be matched due to
legal restrictions. Regarding the papers that use the tax returns data, Guceri and Liu
(2015) estimates the effect of the R&D tax relief on R&D spending that qualifies for
the tax breaks and Dechezlepretre et al. (2016) focuses on the patenting behaviour of
firms, again referring to the data on changes in ‘qualifying’ R&D. Both these latter
studies find very high elasticities of qualifying R&D with respect to its user cost. In
fact, comparing the elasticity of total R&Dwith respect to its user cost from the present
paper (−1.18) with the elasticity of qualifying R&Dwith respect to its user cost found
in Guceri and Liu (2015) (−2.34), we can infer that all of the impact comes from the
qualifying expenditure response, confirming Rao (2016).
In the next section, I present some aggregate trends in the R&D performance of
UK businesses, describe the R&D tax policy framework in the UK and then outline
the conceptual framework. In Sect. 3, I describe the data, and in Sect. 4, I present the
empirical approach. Section 5 presents the results, Sect. 6 presents robustness checks
and Sect. 7 discusses the implications of the results. The final section concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Trends in the UK private sector R&D intensity
Tax incentives for R&D aim to boost the private sector’s R&D performance. An
aggregate measure for a country’s private R&D performance is the intensity of its
Business Enterprise Expenditure on Research and Development (BERD), that is, the
share of BERD in total value added of the private sector. In the past several decades, the
UK private sector’s R&D performance has been sluggish both in absolute terms and
in terms of BERD intensity with respect to comparators such as the USA, Germany,
France and Japan.
Figure 1 shows that total BERDas a share of this sector’s value added has been lower
and has been declining in the UK relative to Japan, Germany, France and the USA over
the period 1990–2013. Earlier studies [(see, for instance, Van Reenen (1997); Griffith
and Harrison (2003)] have shown that this relative decline of UK BERD intensity has
been continuing for several decades. At the aggregate level without controlling for any
other factors, the introduction of tax credits for R&D spending in the UK in 2000 and
2002 appears to have had little impact.
Despite the poor relative performance in overall BERD intensity, the UK manu-
facturing sector BERD as a share of manufacturing sector value added has shown a
steady increase and a tendency towards catching up with its peers. This is illustrated
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Fig. 1 Overall BERD intensity, UK and comparators. Notes the data are from the OECD Main Science
and Technology Indicators (MSTI) Database, series for ‘BERD as a percentage of value added in industry,’
extracted on 21November 2016 fromOECD.Stat. Original data provides further notes on individual country
information
in Fig. 2, which shows that the UK manufacturing sector BERD intensity has been
rising over the most recent decade for which this data is available and since the UK
R&D tax credits were introduced. In the 2000s, as the UKmanufacturing sector BERD
intensity experienced a rise, so did its competitors’; France, Japan and the USA all
experienced steep rises, with only Germany demonstrating a rather horizontal trend.
Bond and Guceri (2012) noted that these peer trends in neighbouring countries may
have been a significant factor in driving the rise in the UK manufacturing sector R&D
intensity, but even controlling for these effects, the UK experienced a steeper rise
starting around the time of introduction of the R&D tax incentives.
2.2 The UK R&D tax incentive scheme
Fiscal incentives for R&D allow a special treatment of R&D expenditure for tax
purposes and encompass a range of tax incentives for both current and capital expen-
ditures: tax credits, cash credits, enhanced deductions, special depreciation allowance
terms, enhanced loss carry backs and carry forwards, to list a few. Tax incentive
schemes for R&D can be of two types: (i) incremental, where firms benefit only
to the extent that they exceed some base level of R&D that they have previously
been performing5 and (ii) volume-based, where firms enjoy benefits on all their
R&D expenditure, regardless of their past level. It is becoming more and more
common to introduce or increase the emphasis on volume-based schemes among
5 Countries apply different rules regarding the base R&D expenditure that the firm needs to exceed.
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Fig. 2 Manufacturing sector BERD intensity, UK and comparators. Notes the data is from the OECD
Structural Analysis (STAN) Database and National Accounts, combining the following series: ‘STAN
R&D expenditures in Industry (ISIC Rev. 4),’ manufacturing sectors (D10T33) in national currency for the
numerator and ‘Detailed National Accounts, SNA 2008: Value added and its components by activity—ISIC
Rev.4 (Edition 2016)’ for the denominator. OECD converts all Euro Zone countries’ national currency
values to Euros for periods prior to Euro Zone accession, both for R&D data and in national accounts. The
data was extracted on 21November 2016 fromOECD.Stat. For the UK and France, BERD inmanufacturing
sectors by product field was used, instead of by main activity. For these countries, there is no data available
on BERD bymain activity for periods earlier than 2007. OECD provides further notes on individual country
information
industrialised countries, as the design is simpler and these benefits can be used by a
larger group of beneficiaries. Altshuler (1988) outlines issues that arise in incremental
schemes.
The UK R&D Tax Relief for Corporation Tax is relatively generous in the sense
that both the SME and the large company schemes are volume-based. The schemes
are in the form of enhanced deductions of qualifying current expenditures from tax-
able income, and loss-making companies can carry forward the benefit indefinitely.
France had an incremental tax credit until 2008, and then switched to a volume-based
credit, greatly simplifying the design of the preceding policy. The USA provides an
incremental tax credit with a 20-year carry forward option, which is a longer time
period than that allowed in most countries. Canada provides a volume-based credit,
and both Canada and the USA also provide sub-national tax credits [see, for instance,
Wilson (2009) for a discussion of sub-national tax credits].
Discussions on a more favourable tax treatment of R&D in the UK began in
the late 1990s. This was at least partly in response to the declining trend in the
R&D intensity of the UK economy overall, which was already at levels below
those of comparators such as France, Japan and Germany as demonstrated in Fig. 1.
Before 2000, when the first significant tax breaks were introduced, all of current
expenditure on R&D was 100% deductible against taxable income and a subset
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Fig. 3 Timeline of changes to the UK R&D tax relief schemes
of capital expenditures could be expensed under the Research and Development
Allowance.6
The UK R&D Tax Relief for Corporation Tax was introduced in two stages. First,
the SME scheme was implemented in April 2000 and then later in 2002, the large
company scheme was introduced. Figure 3 summarises the developments until and
including 2013. The SME scheme was a combination of an enhanced deduction and
cash credits, with the former applying to companies with positive taxable profits and
the latter to those companies which incurred a tax loss in the reference period. The
SME scheme applied to companies which satisfied the SME definition of the EC
Regulation 1996/280/EC and allowed these firms to deduct, for every £100 of qual-
ifying R&D expenditure, £150 from their taxable income.7 These companies could
claim up to 24% of their R&D expenditure in cash if they did not have taxable profit.
The large company scheme was less generous: it allowed the companies that were
above the SME threshold to deduct, for every £100 expenditure, £125 against taxable
income and did not grant any cash credits. When an SME conducts subcontracted
R&D as a result of a contractual relationship with a large company, then the R&D
undertaken by the SME is also subjected to the deduction rates for large companies.
In this study, I focus on the ‘intramural R&D expenditure’ of companies, which is
the component of R&D spending that is subject to different rates for SMEs and large
companies.
Before 2003, there were three separate regimes, first no tax incentives for R&D,
followed by the SME scheme and then the large company scheme (Fig. 3). In 2013,
major changes to the large company scheme were introduced, such as an optional
switch to an above-the-line tax credit and cash refunds for loss-makers accordingly. In
addition, the Patent Boxwas introduced. In light of these developments, a conservative
strategy is to focus on the period 2003–2012. I will show that the main findings do
not change, as we move from the 1999–2013 sample to the 2003–2012 sample. If
anything, the results are stronger for the 2003–2012 sample.
The enhanced deduction rates increased from 1 April 2008 onwards, and this was
followed by a change in the thresholds for defining an ‘SME’ for tax credit purposes.8
According to the EU regulations, the SME definition consists of size thresholds and
6 Formerly known as the ‘Scientific Research Allowance.’ These capital allowances are still available.
7 SME definitions are explained in detail later.
8 The size definition change took place on 1 August 2008, in line with the Corporation Tax Act
(CTA09/Ss1119–1121).
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also requirements related to owner–subsidiary relationships.9 This implies that small
firms that are subsidiaries of large companies, which own stakes more than 25% in the
firm, cannot benefit from the SME incentive scheme. To qualify for the SME credit,
companies need to satisfy the employment criterion and then either the balance sheet
size or the turnover criteria.
During the period of interest for this study, eligibility for the SME tax incentive first
required that the company has fewer than 250 employees, and either a balance sheet
size of less than £43 million or turnover less than £50 million from 2005. In addition
to having satisfied these criteria, the company should not have been owned by a group
that exceeds these limits, or the individual subsidiaries, when aggregated, should not
have exceeded these thresholds. Ownership in this context refers to more than 25% of
the capital or voting rights. After 1 August 2008, the employment, turnover and asset
size thresholds were doubled, allowing companies with fewer than 500 employees and
either a balance sheet size of less than £86 million or turnover less than £100 million
to be able to benefit from the generous SME scheme.
The doubling of the SME tax relief eligibility thresholds allow for a natural treat-
ment group of medium-sized companies that were, prior to 2008, benefiting from the
large company scheme and after 2008, from the more generous SME scheme. The
reduction in the user cost of R&D capital for the treated medium-sized companies was
between 15–21% thanks to the reform.
The binding thresholds are determined by the total group-level employment of each
firm. The Business Structure Database (BSD) covers the population of enterprises and
enterprise groups in the UK and has information on employment on these companies.
This information can be matched with the BERD dataset to determine which firms are
more likely to be treated by the reform.
2.3 Theoretical framework
The theoretical background on evaluating R&D tax credit schemes is influenced by
the literature on tax incentives for physical investment, which is based on the user
cost of capital as a determinant of investment decisions, first formalised by Jorgenson
(1963) and then developed byHall and Jorgenson (1967). Both their theoretical finding
and the empirical analysis point to a significant positive impact of tax credits and
depreciation allowance schemes on the firm’s capital intensity. Following Griliches
(1979), ‘R&D capital stock’ or ‘knowledge stock’ can be considered analogously
to the stock of physical capital, and it is possible to establish the same relationship
between tax incentives and R&D capital [as in Bloom et al. (2002) and Mulkay and
Mairesse (2013)]. In this section, I focus on the static R&D spending decision of
the firm and abstract away from adjustment costs and the long-term accumulation of
knowledge capital, so the model is solved as a static optimisation problem, which
depends on the firm’s ‘knowledge production (Rt )’ in each period, using labour input
9 The criteria for eligibility to the SME tax incentive scheme was determined based on the relevant EC
Regulation. Depending on the year, these were: 1996/280/EC and 2003/361/EC, with the latter taking effect
for accounting periods ending later than 1 January 2005.
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t (Lt , Mt ) subject to F(Lt , Mt ) = ALαLt MαMt , (1)
where the firm’s net revenue function takes into account the taxes paid on corporate
profits at rate τ and tax credits available for inputs into R&D at credit rate c. The net
revenue function in period t is:
t (Lt , Mt ) =(1 − τ)[pt F(Lt , Mt ) − wt Lt − rt Mt ] + c(wt Lt + rt Mt ). (2)
Prices of R&D (pt ), labour (wt ) and other inputs (rMt ) are set exogenously in com-
petitive markets. Denoting the optimal labour, other inputs and R&D output by L∗t ,
M∗t and R∗t , respectively, the effects of an increase in the credit rate on total R&D
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(1 − αL − αM ) (1 − τ)
(1−αL−αM )(1 − τ + c)
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(1−αL−αM ) κM (4)
∂R∗t
∂c
= αL + αM
(1 − αL − αM ) (1 − τ)
(1−αL−αM )(1 − τ + c) −1(1−αL−αM ) κR (5)
where κi are constants for i ∈ {K , L , R}, given input and output prices are set in
competitivemarkets.Assumingdecreasing returns to scale in the ‘productionof knowl-
edge,’ the partial derivatives in Eqs. 3–5 are always positive. Therefore, an increase in
the tax credit rate would be expected to increase the R&D spending by increasing the
R&D headcount in a competitive labour market for R&D employees and the amount
of other inputs. The empirical specifications in Sect. 4 can be thought of as estimat-
ing the factor demand equations derived in this model, with the term that captures
taxes and tax credits represented by a dummy variable in a difference-in-differences
specification.
In this simple standard model, in response to an increase in the rate of tax credits
for R&D, we expect to observe an immediate increase in R&D headcount, materi-
als spending and knowledge production. The assumptions of this framework, such as
decreasing returns to scale in knowledge production, and exogenous price setting in
competitive input and output markets, are also useful for illustrating the potential rea-
sons why we may expect different responses to increased generosity of tax incentives.
For example, if R&D employees have some bargaining power over their compensa-
tion, we may then observe a setting where wt increases in response to an increase in
c, and this may affect Rt without increasing the R&D headcount. In Sects. 5 and 7, I
explore the effects of an increase in the rate of R&D tax credits on total R&D spending
of a firm, as well as its R&D headcount. The empirical specifications in this paper
are influenced by a simple model as the one depicted in this section; however, the
quasi-experimental research design is not reliant on any particular theoretical model.
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3 Data
3.1 Available data sources
The Business Enterprise Research and Development (BERD) survey is conducted
by the ONS, with the purpose of collecting the aggregate and sectoral UK BERD
statistics. The micro-level BERD data has recently become available under secure
conditions for approved research projects. ONS follows the Frascati Manual (OECD
2002) methodology to collect the statistics on BERD. ONS uses stratified sampling
to select the enterprises which will receive a BERD questionnaire form each year. All
questionnaire forms include at least questions on total R&D spending (in-house and
contract R&D) and R&D employment. The micro-level BERD dataset contains all the
reporting unit-year observations that were identified by the ONS as performing R&D
in a given year. The observations that are left outside of the stratified sampling have
imputed values for the questions that are not answered, using the mean values of the
variable as a share of employment in the size band-sector cell. To avoid introducing
measurement error, I do not use these imputed values in the regressions. Further
information is presented in ‘Data description and cleaning’ Appendix and in Guceri
(2015).10 I merge the micro-level BERD dataset with the other relevant ONS datasets;
the ABS and the BSD to obtain firm-level characteristics used as controls in this study.
Even if a firm is not sampled for BERD in a given year, BSD allows us to obtain its
employment value at the enterprise and the group levels. This is crucial for identifying
the treatment and control groups.
The large company scheme was introduced in the 2002 fiscal year, with 2003 as the
first full calendar year of implementation. In 2013, a new tax credit was introduced for
large companies, along with the Patent Box regime, rendering an estimation sample
that is unaffected by other changes than the 2008 policy reform to cover the period
2003–2012.11 I first use the whole dataset available, then refine the years to obtain the
preferred results on this more restricted sample.
Real expenditures on R&D is obtained by deflating the nominal intramural R&D
expenditure from the BERD dataset using a weighted deflator with 50% weight on
researcher salaries and 50% weight on the GDP deflator. Intramural R&D here means
the in-house R&D carried out by the company by its own employees. The researcher
salaries component of the weighted deflator is taken from the Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings (ASHE) tables on gross annual pay for science and technology profes-
sionals (Table code 2.7a, job code 21). The GDP deflator is obtained from the OECD
Economic Outlook ‘pgdp’ series (base year 2008). In the R&D literature, this kind
of weighted deflator is commonly used to reflect the fact that around 50% of R&D
investment goes to the salaries and wages of research staff [(see, for instance, Bloom
et al. (2002)].
10 From Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 15/11.
11 The datasets used in this study were made available by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and the
Secure Data Service (SDS).
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3.2 Assignment to treated and control groups
Assignment to treatment and control groups is based on the threshold for eligibility to
the SMETaxRelief. The BSD contains information on ownership and employment for
all UKfirms.12 The binding threshold to determine eligibility to the SME scheme is the
employment threshold, subject to limitations on ownership by larger groups.13 Before
merging the employment information to the reporting unit-level R&Ddata, I aggregate
employment over enterprise groups (including their non-R&D members) in the BSD
to check whether each reporting unit satisfies the group-level employment thresholds.
In this paper, I use an intent-to-treat approach. In the main set of regressions, I
present the results based on a treatment group defined according to the 2007 employ-
ment status. I take this approach to ensure that treatment status is not endogenous to the
reform. If the firm has 250–500 employees in 2007, then it is allocated to the treated
group, and if it has more than 500 employees, it is allocated to the control group.
Firms with fewer than 250 employees experienced a rate increase in 2008 leading to
a reduction in their user cost of R&D capital. I therefore do not use these smaller
companies’ data in the analysis.
The reporting period for BERD is the calendar year.14 The definition change for
determining an SME was introduced in August 2008, which is eight months into
calendar year 2008. I therefore ignore each firm’s status in 2008 for the purposes of
both the allocation into treated and control groups and also in the estimation stage
when evaluating the response to the policy.
3.3 Comparability between treated and control groups
Figures 4 and 5 present the trends in the two main outcome variables of interest in
the largest available dataset. In Fig. 4, the mean level of the natural logarithm (log)
of R&D spending in the treated (medium-sized) and control (large) companies follow
common trends, as should be expected for the two comparison groups to satisfy the
identifying assumption for a difference-in-difference strategy.
The regression samples are based on a panel of non-imputed observations of BERD
variables on medium-sized and large companies. For companies that were present in
the dataset between 1999 and 2013, and have performed positive R&D at least once
before and once after the reform, the sample contains 270 unique treated firms and 663
control firms. Restricting the sample to the 2003–2012 period, when no substantial
reforms took place that would affect R&D spending by companies (other than the
reform of interest), the sample size is a little smaller but there are still 238 treated
12 Turnover information is sourced by the VAT records and this is only available for firms that are above
the VAT registration thresholds.
13 For example, an enterprise may itself have 200 employees and satisfy one of the turnover or the asset size
thresholds. Then, the group-level check involves aggregating the employment numbers of each member in
the whole group and then assessing whether the group as a whole remains below the thresholds.
14 If the reporting unit does not have the record covering the calendar year, for instance year t , then the
record for a business year that ends between April 6th of period t and April 5th of period t + 1 is reported
for the expenditure in year t .
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Fig. 4 Trends in R&D expenditure (natural logarithm, constant GBP), means across treated and control
groups. Notes the figure shows the pre- and post-treatment trends in the mean of the main outcome variable
(log R&D spending in constant GBP). The blue dots represent the control group (large companies) mean
values and the bars represent the upper and lower bounds of 95% confidence intervals. Similarly, the red
dots represent the treated group (medium-sized companies) mean values, with the bars representing 95%
confidence intervals. The reform was introduced in August 2008. We therefore do not use information from
2008 in any analysis (Color figure online)
Fig. 5 Trends inR&Dheadcount (natural logarithm),means across treated and control groups.Notes thefig-
ure shows the pre- and post-treatment trends in themean of themain outcome variable (logR&Dheadcount).
The blue dots represent the control group (large companies)mean values and the bars represent the upper and
lower bounds of 95% confidence intervals. Similarly, the red dots represent the treated group (medium-sized
companies) mean values, with the bars representing 95% confidence intervals. The reform was introduced
in August 2008. We therefore do not use information from 2008 in any analysis (Color figure online)
123
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firms and 607 control firms. Within the universe of non-imputed observations, in a
representative year (2007), around 42% of observations hadmore than 250 employees,
representing more than 80% of total R&D.
I present detailed descriptive statistics on the regression samples in Tables 1, 2 and
3. These tables show basic descriptives for the values of the main regression variables
and the levels of the outcome variables of interest.15
Two observations are of importance in these tables. First, despite some discrepancy
in raw means, the mean values for the middle 90% for both the treated and the control
groups are very similar. Second, in Table 3 (as in Table 2), the differential increase
between pre- and post-treatment periods for the treated group relative to the control
group is clearly visible. For example, in the 2003–2012 sample, this statistic for log
R&D spending only increased from 7.41 to 7.43 for the control group, whereas the
treated group experienced a rise from7.30 to 7.36. For the control group, the level of the
R&Dheadcount was roughly stable, dropping from 43 to 42, whereas the treated group
saw the same statistic rise from around 38 R&D personnel to around 44. Finally, the
R&D spending per R&D worker, which may indicate a price effect of tax incentives,
experienced parallel increases for both the treated and control groups, and does not
show a differential rise in either group in the post-treatment period.
On regression samples, I formally test the differences in pre-treatment dynamics
of the outcome variables of interest using t tests (Tables 4 and 25). I cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the changes in the outcome variables between the beginning
and the end of the pre-treatment period are the same across treated (medium-sized)
and control (large) firms. Figure 6 shows the kernel densities of the differences in
log real R&D spending for the treated (medium) and control (large) groups (for the
2003–2012 period). ‘Additional t tests for pre-treatment dynamics between treated
and control groups’ Appendix provides additional tests with different base years as a
robustness check. These figures visually demonstrate that the distribution of the time
changes are similar between treated and control groups.
The sectoral compositions of medium-sized and large firms between pre- and post-
treatment periods are roughly similar, as can be observed in Figs. 7 and 8. In the figures,
the blue line represents reporting units that belong to medium-sized firms and the red
line represents reporting units that belong to larger firms with 500–1000 employees.
In Figure 7, I present the pre-treatment period shares of observations in each of the
sectors for medium-sized and then large firms.16 Figure 8 traces the changes in the
sectoral compositions between pre- and post-treatment periods across the two groups,
and apart from the ‘Food’ sector, the changes between pre- and post-treatment periods
in the number of observations seem to have the same sign between the medium-sized
and large groups.
15 Mean of the middle 90% has been chosen as a measure for central tendency that is unaffected by
outliers. Publication of percentile values, including the median, are not allowed due to data confidentiality
requirements of the Secure Lab/Office for National Statistics.
16 The medium-sized and large firm groups that are presented in these figures are broader than the treated
and control group samples used in the regressions. In the final regression samples, the number of observations
in a few sectors fall below the ONS disclosure thresholds and therefore I present these statistics in the larger
samples, which provide a similar picture as the treated and control groups in the final regressions.
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Table 4 Pre-treatment dynamics for key outcome variables, t test for the null of equal dynamics between
treated and control groups
Outcome Log(Real R&D) Log(R&D Headcount)
Mean value (control) 0.016 −0.090
Mean value (treated) −0.070 −0.010
p_value 0.389 0.924
No. of obs (control) 322 319
No. of obs (treated) 100 100
The table presents the mean values for the change in indicated outcomes between the beginning and the
end of the pre-treatment period. Beginning of the pre-treatment period is marked by the periods presented
in the table. End of the pre-treatment period is the 2007 value. ‘p_value’ is the p_value for the t test of the
null hypothesis that the means of the two samples (treated and control) are equal to each other. The number
of observations is smaller than the whole sample since all the firms were not sampled in the period both the
base year and in 2007
4 Empirical approach
As the difference-in-difference specification, I estimate the following base model:
rit = γ + δI Di Tt + δT Tt + x′i tβx + ηi + νi t (6)
where rit is the natural logarithm of R&D spending of reporting unit i in year t in 2008
prices, Di is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 for treated observations, 0 for the
control group, Tt is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 for post-2008 and 0 otherwise.17
The coefficient δI on the interaction term DiTt thus captures any differential change
in rit between the pre- and post-2008 periods for the treatment group compared to
the control group, and the null hypothesis of no impact of the introduction of more
generous tax incentives formedium-sized firms corresponds to δI = 0. ηi are reporting
unit fixed effects. I later drop Tt and include a full set of year dummies. xi t is a
K × 1 vector of controls, which, in different sets of results, include sector dummies,
year dummies, lagged employment (in log), employment growth rates (in log) and a
quadratic term for lagged (log) employment. I use Poisson and negative binomial count
models to estimate the difference-in-difference specifications with R&D headcount
as the dependent variable. In specifications with R&D headcount as the dependent
variable, I use the levels of lagged employment, its square and growth rate as controls.
Identification with the difference-in-difference estimator requires that the common
trends assumption be satisfied; that is, in the absence of treatment, we should expect
the change in the outcome variable between pre- and post-intervention periods for the
control group to be similar to the change in the outcome variable for the treatment
group. I discuss the comparisons for pre-reform time differences in treated and control
outcomes in Section 3.3. These comparisons support that there are no significant
differential trends between treated and control groups in other years than the treatment
17 In regression tables, the dummy variable Tt is labelled as Post2008.
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Fig. 6 Kernel densities, differences in pre-treatment dynamics of R&D expenditure (log, constant GBP)
and R&D headcount (log). aReal R&D expenditure (log). bR&D headcount (log)Notes the figures present
the density of the changes between the beginning of the pre-treatment period and the end of the pre-treatment
period in key outcome variables. a shows the kernel density of the changes in the R&D spending variable
in the treated and control groups. b shows the kernel density of the changes in the R&D headcount variable
in the treated and control groups
year. In Sect. 6, I present results from regressions with placebo reforms in earlier years
than the policy change.
5 Results
I focus on the impact of the reform on two main outcome variables to capture whether
tax incentives increase R&D spending by firms at the intensive margin, and if so,
whether an increase in price or quantity drives the observed effect. These variables are
real R&D spending and the R&D headcount. An observed increase in R&D spending,
with a similar increase in headcount employment may mean that quantity effects
123
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Fig. 7 Sectoral distribution of medium-sized and large companies in the pre-treatment period
Fig. 8 Change in the sectoral distribution of medium-sized and large companies in the post-treatment
period
dominate. Thismay in turn indicate that firms hire a larger number of R&D employees,
possibly as a result of a larger uptake of new R&D projects, which is the intended first
order effect of the policy. We can then also examine the effects on the R&D spending
per R&D worker, which may give information about the price effects as well. A wage
123
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increase for researchers would lead to a significant increase in R&D spending per
R&D worker.
5.1 Effect of the reform on R&D spending
Columns (1)–(5) of Table 5 present the difference in difference (diff-in-diff) regression
results from the largest possible sample that covers 1999–2013.18 Standard errors are
clustered at the reporting unit level. Column (1) presents estimates from the model in
Eq. 6 without any controls. The positive effect of the policy is captured by The coeffi-
cient labelled ’Treatment x Post2008’ (diff-in-diff), and the estimate has a magnitude
of around 15% which is statistically significant at the 95% level. In Column (2), the
‘Post2008’ dummy is replaced by year fixed effects and two digit sector dummies
are also included in the model. In Column (3), I include a control variable for firm
size, which is lagged level of employment. Firm size and growth rate variables are
all lagged by one period to avoid potential issues due to the simultaneous determina-
tion of total employment and R&D spending. In Column (4), I include a control for
the lagged growth rate of the firm along with the lagged level of employment, which
turns out to be a significant control variable, and together the control variables drive
the magnitude of the diff-in-diff coefficient upward by 2 percentage points relative to
Column (1). Finally, in Column (5), I add the full set of control variables including a
quadratic term for the firm size measure. In the preferred specification (estimated in
Column (5)), the diff-in-diff estimates indicate a positive and significant effect of the
policy on treated firms, with a magnitude of around 15%.
Columns (6)–(10) of Table 5 restrict the sample to a period where no substantial
policy changes took place except the 2008 reforms. To be included in this sample, a
firm needs to have performed R&D at least once before and once after the reform, and
the pre-reform period covers 2003–2007, the post-reform period covers 2009–2012.
Column (6) starts with no time dummies or size controls. Control variables are added
the same way as in Columns (2)–(5) from Column (7) onward. In Columns (6)–(10)
of Table 5, the diff-in-diff coefficient is consistently estimated to be around 20–21%
and highly significant.
The estimated effect of the reform is remarkably stable across all specifications,
and all show a large and significant effect. In the preferred specification (reported in
Column (10)), the estimated magnitude is 20%.
5.2 Is the measured effect driven by price or quantity?
Next, I explore themechanisms that drive the increase in R&D spending. First, I exam-
ine the effect of the policy on the R&D employment of treated companies. Goolsbee
(1998) argues that, due to the inelastic supply of scientists and researchers, R&D sub-
sidies only boost the salaries of researchers instead of driving firms to take on new
18 The Business Structure Database (BSD) data begins in 1997. Lagged employment growth rate controls
require the two-period-lagged level of employment. The sample starts at 1999 to enable the inclusion of


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Will the real R&D employees please stand up?
R&D projects and therefore increase their R&D efforts. In light of this argument, I
explore whether the price or quantity effects drive the increase in firm-level R&D. In
the BERD data, there is non-imputed information on the R&D headcount that may
help explain this effect. Because R&D employment is a count variable, I use Pois-
son and negative binomial regressions with reporting unit fixed effects to evaluate
the impact of the reform on the R&D headcount. Table 6 presents the results from
Poisson regressions with R&D employment as the dependent variable. In robustness
checks, I report similar results using negative binomial regressions. As before, the first
column does not include additional control variables, and Columns (2)–(5) gradually
add time dummies and sector dummies, followed by size controls in Columns (3)–(5).
Columns (6)–(10) repeat the exercise for the more conservative 2003–2012 sample.
The table provides evidence in support of a positive effect of the policy on the R&D
headcount, with a magnitude of around 17–19%. Estimates for the diff-in-diff coef-
ficient in Table 6 are statistically significant, and the magnitude of the coefficient is
consistent across the different columns.
In order to compare this ‘quantity response’with a potential ‘price response,’ finally,
I estimate the effect of the reformonR&Dspending perR&Dworker inTable 7. If there
are significant effects of the reform on this variable, then it would be more difficult to
argue that quantity effects dominate. The interaction terms in all the columns of Table 7
support that the per worker spending in R&D has not been affected significantly by
the policy reform, suggesting that the quantity effects are driving the result on R&D
spending.
Finally, I test the impact of the policy change on firms’ spending on ‘extramural
R&D,’ which includes R&D that is subcontracted to external parties by the firm.
There is a small number of firms that report positive extramural R&D in the survey,
and perhaps unsurprisingly, I do not find any significant effect of the reform on this
variable. Additionally, we would expect extramural R&D to remain unaffected by the
reform, since these expenditures are not eligible for themore generous SME deduction
rates.
6 Robustness
6.1 Results using a more comparable control group
Howcomparable aremedium-sized companies that have between 250 and 500 employ-
ees, and large companies that have more than 500 employees? All else held constant,
we would expect companies which have only slightly more than 500 employees to be
more similar to the medium-sized firms in our sample. In this section, I examine the
changes in results when I use information only from observations that are close to the
500-employee threshold in the control group. I discuss results that restrict the control
group to firms with fewer than 800, 750 and 700 employees and then also restrict
the size of the treatment group to include more than 300 employees, in the spirit of a
regression discontinuity design.
Table 8 presents the results from regressions that restrict the employment size of

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































observations and the number of unique firms in the control group, which dropped
from 607 in Table 5 to 137 in Table 8. The regression results are similar to the original
results from Table 5. If we focus on the most restrictive specification with all controls
included in the 2003–2012 sample (Table 5, Column (10)), the diff-in-diff interaction
term is significant with a very similar magnitude in the corresponding Column (10)
in Table 8. Table 9 then confirms that the effect is driven by an increase in headcount
R&D employment for the similarly restricted sample with employment less than 800
in the control group.
Further restricting the control group employment size threshold to 750 in Tables 10
and 11 does not lower the magnitude or the significance of the diff-in-diff estimates.
In fact, there are a few percentage point increases in the magnitude of the diff-in-
diff coefficient for the 2003–2012 sample, and an even larger increase for the 1999–
2013 sample.19 The results that restrict the control group firm size to 700 employees
(Tables 12, 13) demonstrate similar coefficient magnitudes.
The results that I present in Tables 14 and 15 combine the diff-in-diff approach with
a regression discontinuity design. These results are based on amore restrictive sample,
with the treated group constrained to firms that include more than 300 employees and
the control group constrained to firms that include fewer than 700 employees. Even
with much reduced sample sizes, these estimates support that the differential effect of
the policy on R&D spending was significant, with a magnitude of at least 23%. I find
that the differential effect of the policy on R&D headcount was also significant, with
a magnitude of at least 25%. The results are once again stable across different slices
of data and specifications.
6.2 Other robustness checks and placebo tests
In this section, I check the robustness of the results to the presence of outliers and
different estimationmethods, and then I explore the presence of differential pre-reform
movements in any of the pre-treatment periods through placebo reforms. In the post-
treatment period, if there are very large jumps to high outlier values in treated group
outcomes, or very large jumps to low outlier values in control group outcomes, then
the average treatment effect will appear to be large, but the result would be misleading.
Theremay also have been very low pre-treatment outcomes in the treated group, which
then rise to normal levels, or very high pre-treatment outcomes in the control group,
which then stabilise to normal levels in the post-treatment period. To ensure that such
observations do not drive themain findings, I winsorise the top and bottom 5 percentile
values for each of the outcome variables and report the results in Table 16 for R&D
spending and in Table 17 for R&D headcount. The results are robust to winsorising the
top and bottom 1 percentile, as well as trimming instead of winsorising (I present these
latter results in ‘Further robustness checks to test for the effect of outliers’ Appendix).
19 The increase in coefficient magnitudes for the 1999–2013 is a few percentage points higher than that
for the 2003–2012 sample. These small changes in the point estimates seem to be driven by just under 60
firms.
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Will the real R&D employees please stand up?
The Poisson regression method is commonly used in regressions with a count out-
come variable (for examples and technical aspects, see Cameron and Trivedi 1998).
However, the Poisson method relies on the assumption that the mean of the outcome
variable is equal to its variance, which is often violated due to overdispersion.20 I
therefore check the robustness of the results to estimating an alternative count data
model, which is the negative binomial model. In Table 18, I present the main regres-
sion results with R&D headcount variable as the dependent variable (Table 18). The
results from negative binomial regressions indicate that the differential increase in
R&D headcount for the treated firms was between 17 and 20% and highly significant.
Differently from the Poisson estimates, the results which use the 1999–2013 sample
(Columns (1)–(5)) and the 2003–2012 sample (Columns (6)–(10)) are very similar in
both magnitude and significance.
Identification using the diff-in-diff method requires that in the absence of the policy
intervention, the treated and control group outcomes do not follow differential trends.
I use placebo interventions in the pre-treatment periods as a robustness check to test
pre-intervention period movements in the outcome variables. These are presented in
Table 19 and 20. In both tables, Column (1) reports the results from a placebo test
with 2003 as the placebo reform period with only firm, sector, and year fixed effects
as controls. In Column (2), all size controls, namely the employment level, growth
rate and squared employment level are included. Column pairs from Column (3) until
Column (10) check the absence of a placebo effect for each of the pre-reform periods
that follow. In each of these years, using the preferred specification, I find no significant
differential change in any of the pre-reform periods. The confidence intervals around
these placebo reform years are tight around zero.
6.3 Did the reform come as a surprise?
One question in a policy setting where the announcement of the policy predates
implementation is whether beneficiaries adjust their investment behaviour after the
announcement but prior to implementation of the policy. In the case of the R&D Tax
Relief schemes in the UK, the Chancellor announced the Government’s intention to
introduce the policy reform in the prior year’s Budget before the reform took place, but
enactment required EU State Aid clearance and implementation was at best uncertain
from the perspective of potential beneficiaries. In this section, I present results from
regressions which remove the years after the Chancellor’s announcement prior to the
reform, and the first period after reform.
The simplest way of assessing whether there has been any strategic delaying is to
omit all the periods between announcement and the first period of implementation.
Omission of the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 achieves this objective (Tables 21, 22). The
estimated impact of the introduction of the more generous tax relief for larger firms
remains very similar to that obtained using the full sample, suggesting an increase in
R&D by around 17–19%. The smaller sample size results in a marginal reduction in
the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient on the diff-in-diff interaction
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Will the real R&D employees please stand up?
term, but there is no indication that our full sample results are seriously biased by firms
postponingR&Dexpenditure until after the introduction of the change in the eligibility
criteria in August 2008. Once again, the R&D headcount results are stable, with the
preferred specification (Column (10)) in the more restrictive sample of 2003–2012
yielding a significant diff-in-diff coefficient with a magnitude around 23%.
6.4 Is there reason to believe that there is no relabelling?
An important concern in the study of the impact ofR&D tax incentives is the possibility
that firms report a large chunk of administrative expenses as R&D to benefit from the
more generous tax treatment of their R&D expenditures. In the BERD survey, firms
should not have an incentive to lie about their R&D spending, as ONS gives them
information that their responses in the BERD survey is to be kept confidential (Fig. 9).
Bloom et al. (2002) argues that the use of statistical offices’ R&D survey data, as
opposed to the tax data, should alleviate any issues of relabelling. To the extent that
firms keep their R&D records for the purpose of responding to ONS’s BERD Survey
separate from their tax records, we should not expect to observe relabelling of ordinary
spending as R&D in the BERD data. In terms of evidence for relabelling in firms’
tax returns, the few studies which had suitable data so far did not find systematic
relabelling, at least in developed countries (For example, based on evidence from the
USA and Australia, Hall (1995) reports no substantive evidence for relabelling). In
the UK context, HMRC set up Specialist R&D units to reinforce compliance and take
up of R&D tax credits (National Audit Office 2014).
Fig. 9 Cover page remarks from the Office for National Statistics. Notes The figure shows a snapshot
of the cover page of the BERD short form survey. The section that informs the respondents about the
confidentiality of answers has been magnified. In addition to the confidentiality remark, ONS reminds the
respondent here that filling out the firm is compulsory. The survey forms are similar across years, and the




The UK R&D tax incentive scheme has gradually become more generous, now with
more than £1 billion cost to the Exchequer in foregone corporation tax revenue annu-
ally. The findings of this paper suggest that the reform in the R&D tax relief that
changed the status of the enterprises in the treatment group from ‘large’ to ‘SME’
caused these firms to increase their R&D spending by 15–20%. Guceri and Liu (2015)
estimate that the drop in the user cost of R&D capital for the treated group of firms
thanks to the 2008 reform of the SME tax relief eligibility criteria was around 17%. In
the BERD data, I do not have information on the tax position of each firm and therefore
cannot calculate individual values for the user cost of R&D, but in this section, I refer
to the point estimate of 17% in order to infer the implied user cost elasticity.
From themaindiff-in-diff point estimates of 20.4 and14.9%(upper and lower bound
estimates for preferred specifications in Table 5), one can back out the elasticity of
R&D with respect to its user cost, based on the finding that the introduction of the
change in the SME scheme eligibility criteria resulted in a reduction in the user cost
of R&D by about 17% in the UK. The 20.4 and 14.9% increase in spending therefore
corresponds to a user cost elasticity estimate of about −1.18 and −0.88, respectively.
Using the BERD dataset, there is evidence that the increase in R&D spending is
attributable to an increase in R&D headcount rather than higher salaries for R&D
personnel.
Based on the estimated additionality effect of the policy of 15–20% and the corre-
sponding cost of the R&D tax relief to HMRC, it is possible to calculate an estimate
for the return for every pound of HMRC’s foregone corporation tax revenue. The
reform increased the burden of each unit of a medium-sized firm’s R&D on the
Exchequer from 0.30 × τ to 0.75 × τ , where τ is the statutory tax rate that applied
to each firm.21 In addition to this extra cost per unit of R&D, treated firms increase
their R&D spending by about 20% in response to the policy reform, and hence, the
cost to the Exchequer increases indirectly as well. For a firm that pays taxes at the
main rate of 28% in the 2008–2010 period, every £1 R&D generated by the pol-
icy reform of 20% results in HMRC to forego £0.23 of tax revenue. Similarly, for a
firm that pays taxes at the small profits rate of 21%, after the reform, HMRC loses
£0.17 of tax revenue due to the reclassification of treated firms as SME and not large
for the purpose of the R&D tax relief. These two estimates result in an estimated
bang-for-the-buck ranging between £0.9 and £1.2. The same calculations based on a
15% increase in R&D spending leads to bang-for-the-buck estimates between £0.75
and £0.9. Based on the simple calculation without considering any spillovers that
may be generated by the policy, the results suggest that the Exchequer recovers its
cost.
Throughout the paper, I assume that the firms’ measured response to the increased
generosity of tax incentives is a long-run effect. Prior evidence suggests that firms
take a few years to adjust to the new equilibrium level of R&D after an increase
21 The calculation assumes away the firm specific discounting of losses carried forward and the value of
cash claims. The calculation can be thought of as one where all the firms pay taxes, at least at the small
profits rate.
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in the generosity of R&D tax incentives (Bloom et al. 2002). In the current quasi-
experimental setup, one way of exploring any adjustment issues is to introduce year-
by-year treatment interaction terms for each of the years in the post-treatment period
and pin down the year(s) inwhich the policy effect becomesmore apparent. The results
in Table 23 (Columns (6)–(10)) show that on average, R&D spending seems to have
responded relatively quickly, but with gradual adjustment over time. R&D headcount
seems to have responded with some lag, which may be attributable to frictions in the
supply of scientists and engineers (Table 24).
8 Conclusion
The number of countries which offer R&D tax incentives to stimulate business R&D
spending has been increasing rapidly in the past few decades. After a long period
of relative decline in aggregate R&D intensity, the UK joined the group of countries
which offer generous fiscal incentives for R&D in 2000. The first reform in 2000 was
the introduction of the SME Tax Relief Scheme, followed by the introduction of the
large company scheme in 2002, which was less generous than the SME scheme. In
2008, the definition of an ‘SME’ for the purpose of the R&D Tax Relief expanded
to include a group of medium-sized companies with up to 500 employees.22 In this
study, I exploited the reduction in the user cost of R&D formedium-sized companies in
comparison with their slightly larger counterparts to obtain difference-in-differences
estimates of the impact of R&D tax incentives.
Tax credits have a direct effect on the firms’ cost of investing in R&D.Motivated by
a simple neoclassical theoretical framework, the empirical specifications in this paper
examined the effects of the change in the eligibility thresholds to the SME tax relief
scheme on R&D spending and on R&D employment at the micro-level.
Controlling for firm size and growth using firm-level employment information from
the business register, I have found that treatment group companies which started to
benefit from the SME scheme after the 2008–2009 fiscal year increased their R&D
spending by around 15–20% in comparison with the control group after the intro-
duction of the policy. The robust estimate of the 20% increase over the counterfactual
scenario of less generous tax credits for treated firms translates to an elasticity of R&D
with respect to its user cost of around −1.18.23 The corresponding bang-for-the-buck
estimates of £0.75–£1.2 suggest that the tax authority roughly recovers its additional
cost of implementing the new policy.
The BERD survey does not give any incentives to its respondents to relabel ordi-
nary spending as R&D. I therefore argue that, differently from the studies that use
administrative data, there is no reason for the magnitude of the effect found in this
study to be affected by concerns related to relabelling.
Many young innovative start ups incur frequent losses. The UK R&D tax relief
allows firms to receive a cash refund when in a loss-making position. In comparison
22 Employment is the binding threshold. There are other thresholds based on turnover and size, which are
discussed in detail in Sect. 2.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































with R&D tax incentive schemes in many other countries, the effectiveness of the tax
incentive on R&D spending and headcount in the UK may be positively influenced
by the more symmetric treatment of losses and profits in the context of the R&D tax
relief. This is an important design aspect in the UK context that policymakers around
the world may need to consider in benchmarking the relative performance of R&D
tax relief schemes.
I find evidence that the increase in R&D spending may have been driven by an
increase in R&D headcount in response to the policy, instead of an increase in the
‘price’ of R&D or scientists’ salaries. Policymakers may be interested in scaling up
a certain type of spending within business R&D, and in the policy design, they may
consider differentiating between R&D spending items such as headcount, salaries or
materials. The findings here suggest that the quantity effects dominate even in the
absence of such differentiation.
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Appendix
Data description and cleaning
BERDdata is available at the ‘reporting unit’ level,which corresponds to the geograph-
ical unit that has the postal address of the firm. The reporting unit may or may not be
larger than a ‘local unit’; therefore, it may be larger than a single plant or a single R&D
lab. It may be attached to the headquarters or can be a separate unit. A slightly larger
statistical unit than the reporting unit is the ‘enterprise,’ which is defined in the EU
Regulation on Statistical Units (EEC 696/93) as ‘...an organisational unit producing
goods or services, which benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-
making, especially for the allocation of its current resources...’. BERD observations
have the reporting unit as their identifier and most of them also contain the enterprise
reference number.
An ‘enterprise group’ is defined as ‘an association of enterprises bound together by
legal and/or financial links. A group of enterprises can have more than one decision-
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Fig. 10 Kernel density estimates for y-o-y real growth in R&D, size band 100–399. Notes this figure
presents the distribution of time differences between actual and imputed BERD values in the data. These
figures have been taken from an earlier working paper on this topic (Guceri 2015). Therefore, the underlying
data uses fewer years than those used in the present paper
making centre [...]. It constitutes an economic entity which is empowered to make
choices, particularly concerning the units which it comprises (EEC 696/93).’ The
definition of an enterprise group is important for our purposes, as assignment to the
treatment group depends on whether the group as a whole satisfies the criteria for
eligibility to the SME scheme. Reporting unit-level R&D data in BERD is matched
to the BSD at the enterprise level. BERD provides information on both the reporting
unit and enterprise references for each observation.
The ONS constructs the BERD dataset using the responses to two types of ques-
tionnaire forms sent out to firms: a long form and a short form. About 400 largest
spenders (those who spent more than £3 million in a reference year) on R&D receive
a long-form questionnaire, and the rest receive a short-form questionnaire. This latter
form contains a small set of questions tracing basic information, namely, the unit’s:
(i) in-house R&D expenditure, (ii) extramural R&D expenditure, (iii) full time equiv-
alent number of R&D personnel and (iv) total headcount on R&D. The long form
collects a much wider set of variables, including a breakdown of R&D expenditure to
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Fig. 11 Kernel densities, differences in pre-treatment dynamics of R&D expenditure (log, constant GBP)
and R&D headcount (log). a Real R&D expenditure (log), base year 1999. b R&D headcount (log), base
year 1999. c Real R&D expenditure (log), base year 2004. d R&D headcount (log), base year 2004. Notes
the figures present the density of the changes between the beginning of the pre-treatment period (1999 or
2004) and the end of the pre-treatment period (2007) in key outcome variables. a shows the kernel density
of the changes in the R&D spending variable in the treated and control groups. b shows the kernel density
of the changes in the R&D headcount variable in the treated and control groups
current expenditure; sources of funding for R&D; a breakdown of the skills set for
R&D employment; and a breakdown of R&D expenditure into geographic locations
(UK postcodes). As smaller firms tend to spend less on R&D than larger firms, the
information available on SMEs is mostly limited to the questions asked in the short
form.
The group of smaller firms (as they are less likely to be among the top 400 spenders)
are subject to sampling at different sampling fractions depending on their size mea-
sured by employment. Since the stratified sampling procedure is repeated every year,
this causes gaps in the time series data. Based on the publicly available BERD First
Release data,24 the breakdown of participants to BERD Inquiry into long- and short-
form recipients is around 4000 sampled firms, out of which around 400 are sent a long
form and the rest are sent a short form. Out of the firms which receive short forms,
all those with more than 400 employees are sampled. Within the size band of interest,
there are firms with 250–400 employees, for which the sampling ratio is 1:3.25 The
24 Until 2007, this publication was part of the MA14 Business Monitor.
25 Firms with 100–400 employees are sampled with this ratio.
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Fig. 12 Kernel densities, differences in pre-treatment dynamics of R&D expenditure (log, constant GBP)
and R&D headcount (log). a Real R&D expenditure (log), base year 2005. b R&D headcount (log), base
year 2005. c Real R&D expenditure (log), base year 2006. d R&D headcount (log), base year 2006. Notes
the figures present the density of the changes between the beginning of the pre-treatment period (2005 or
2006) and the end of the pre-treatment period (2007) in key outcome variables. a shows the kernel density
of the changes in the R&D spending variable in the treated and control groups. b shows the kernel density
of the changes in the R&D headcount variable in the treated and control groups
smallest firms, that is, those with fewer than 100 employees are sampled with a 1:4
ratio.
When aggregating the data for the BERD publication, the ONS imputes the values
for the unsampled firms based on their employment number and product group. In
each of the 99 product group-size band ‘cells’ available (33 product groups over 3 size
bands), the values for the unsampled observations are imputed using the average R&D
per worker value of those observations which are not imputed, with employment as
the scaling variable. For instance, if an unsampled firm in sector H (Pharmaceuticals)
and size band 2 (100–400 employees) has ‘x’ employees (this information is available
through the IDBR for all firms), their unknown in-house R&D spending is imputed
as the mean R&D per worker in that cell multiplied by the employment number ‘x’
of the observation. This imputation procedure introduces a high level of variation
across years for a given reporting unit when the micro panel version of the dataset
is used. The variance of the growth rate in R&D spending from one year to the next
increases significantly between two years of data when these are imputed, and also
when one of the two values is imputed. Figure 10 is taken from an earlierworking paper
on this topic (Guceri 2015), and demonstrates the uneven distribution of changes in
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R&D over time when the observation moves from an actual value to an imputed value
and vice versa. The distribution of R&D growth rates is a smooth bell-shaped curve
only for those observations which move from an actual value to another year’s actual
value.
Additional t tests for pre-treatment dynamics between treated and control
groups
In this section, I present further tests of pre-treatment dynamics between treated and
control group outcomes. In Table 4 the reference period is 2003, which is the starting
point of the preferred sample. Some firms were not included in the BERD sample
for 2003, resulting in the number of firms in 2003 to be smaller than the number of
firms in the main regression specification. In Table 25, I check differential changes
between different base years and the last pre-treatment period to ensure that there are
no differential time changes in the main outcome variables of interest between treated
and control groups that are unrelated to the policy reform. None of the t tests reject
the null hypothesis of equal pre-treatment differences between the treated and control
groups at conventional levels of significance (Figs. 11, 12).
Further robustness checks to test for the effect of outliers
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